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Practical Reason and the Strange Persistence of Akrasia

Akrasia — weakness of will — has been an embarrassment for any theory on which acting against one’s better judgment is a contradiction in terms. Davidson’s classic paper tried to dissolve the embarrassment by reinterpreting akratic action as conforming to the agent’s all-out judgment, even when it conflicts with their all-things-considered one. This rescues the rationality of the agent at the cost of saying nothing illuminating about why the conflict happened in the first place.

What recent moral psychology adds

The empirical literature on dual-process cognition has given us a more useful vocabulary, but a worse philosophical position. It is true that some of what we call akrasia tracks a competition between fast and slow systems. But labelling the loser “System 2” does not tell us why the agent identifies with the verdict that System 2 produced. The agential question is not which system won; it is why the agent feels betrayed by the loss.

The phenomenology of akrasia is not the phenomenology of being overpowered. It is the phenomenology of having let yourself down.

A small proposal

I have been working on the idea that akrasia is best understood as a failure of endorsement-uptake: the agent’s judgment is genuinely held, but the practical machinery that converts judgment into motivation has not (yet) caught up. The treatment, if there is one, is not better arguments but better habits — structures that compress the gap between the verdict and the act. This is not new advice. It is, however, a defensible reason for taking the old advice seriously.

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One thought

  1. Endorsement-uptake is a nice phrase. Has anyone connected it to Frankfurt-style hierarchical accounts of the will?

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