Strong narrative-self views — that we are the stories we tell about ourselves, that having a coherent narrative is constitutive of being a person — have come in for serious criticism, most notably from Galen Strawson, who flatly denies the descriptive claim and rejects the normative one. He is, on his own report, an episodic, not a narrative, person. He functions perfectly well as a moral agent. Many people, perhaps most, do not in fact organize their lives narratively. Stories are not constitutive.
The weaker view
Strawson is right about the strong claim. But there is a weaker view in the neighborhood that I think survives him. It runs like this. We do not need to live narratively to be persons, but when we make consequential decisions — whether to leave, whether to commit, whether to forgive — we typically reason narratively whether we mean to or not. We invoke characters (often ourselves), arcs, foreshadowings. These narrative resources are not optional decoration. They are how we make practical sense of trade-offs between the present and the rest of life.
You can deny that you are a story. You will still find yourself reasoning like one when the stakes are high.
The risk
Narrative reasoning is also what makes us prone to rationalizing past behavior, romanticizing future selves, and confusing genre conventions for moral truths. The defense of narrative selfhood is therefore inseparable from a discipline about which narratives we permit ourselves. I think this is the live ethical question lurking inside the metaphysical one.
I read Strawson as making a stronger normative claim too — that narrativity is sometimes pernicious. Worth engaging.
Yes. The “discipline about which narratives we permit ourselves” is the real ethics.