Skip to content

What We Owe to Future Selves

If personal identity does not come with the strong metaphysical bonds we ordinarily assume, then the duties we have to our future selves cannot rest on identity either. They have to be earned — or argued for — in the same currency as our duties to others. That is unsettling, because most of us do not actually feel anything like a moral obligation to the seventy-five-year-old we will become. We feel a kind of dim solidarity, occasionally guilt, often denial.

The asymmetry no one explains

Consider: you would refuse to inflict on a stranger a pain that, in your own future, you cheerfully accept (cigarettes, sleep deprivation, deferred medical care). The standard Parfittian move is to take this asymmetry as an argument for caring more about strangers, not less about future selves. But this is too quick. The structure of prudential reasoning has features — epistemic access, narrative continuity, projective imagination — that the structure of altruistic reasoning lacks. Those features could ground special obligations to future selves even on a thin metaphysics of identity.

You are the only person who can save you specifically. That is not a metaphysical claim. It is a logistical one. And it grounds a real duty.

The case for soft prudence

I am increasingly persuaded that what we owe future selves is something like the duties of stewardship: the duties we owe a project we have agreed to carry. We do not owe our future selves everything (we can quit jobs, leave cities, change names). But we do owe them honesty about the trajectory we are setting them on. Most of what wrecks future selves is not catastrophe; it is small dishonesties accumulated by present selves who told themselves it would not compound.

More from this kitchen

One thought

  1. I would push back on the stewardship framing. It still presupposes an ongoing project, which seems to smuggle in a thicker self.

Comments are closed on this post.