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Risk, Voluntariness, and Moral Responsibility

The standard view about voluntary risk-taking is that an agent who knowingly exposes herself to a risk thereby reduces the claims she has against others if the risk materializes. The view is intuitive in extreme cases — the mountaineer who declines a rope cannot complain of injustice when she falls — but its application to more ordinary cases is, I think, less clear than it is usually treated as being.

Consider three kinds of voluntary risk-taking.

Recreational risk. An agent skis off-piste, paraglides, climbs a difficult route. She knows the activity carries a small but non-trivial chance of serious injury.

Economic risk. An agent takes a job in a more volatile industry, invests in equities rather than bonds, starts a small business.

Consumer risk. An agent uses products whose long-term effects on her welfare are uncertain. She drinks alcohol, smokes, drives a car, eats certain foods.

The literature tends to treat these as continuous — voluntariness is voluntariness, and the more voluntary the exposure, the weaker the agent’s claims after the risk materializes. I want to suggest the three cases come apart in important ways.

Voluntariness and information

The first complication is informational. Voluntary risk-taking presupposes that the agent knows what she is risking. But the agents in the three cases above know different things to different degrees of precision.

The recreational risk-taker typically has a relatively concrete picture of what could go wrong: she could fall, she could be caught in an avalanche, she could lose a finger to frostbite. The economic risk-taker has a less concrete picture — she might lose her job, she might lose some fraction of her savings — but the dimensions of loss are at least clearly framed. The consumer risk-taker often has the least concrete picture. The aggregate harm to her welfare from a lifetime of moderate alcohol consumption is, for any individual case, deeply uncertain.

If voluntariness requires informed exposure, then voluntariness comes in degrees, and the degree to which the agent’s subsequent claims are weakened tracks the degree to which she actually understood the risk profile she was assuming.

Voluntariness and choice architecture

The second complication is structural. The agent who chooses to engage in a risky activity does so against a background of options. The same act — consuming alcohol, say — might be a paradigm of voluntary risk-taking in one social context and a near-coerced default in another. The voluntariness of the agent’s choice is partly a function of the choice architecture she faces.

This matters because the standard view tends to treat voluntariness as a property of the agent’s mental state at the moment of choice. But mental states are responsive to environments. An agent who has been shaped by a particular pattern of advertising, social cuing, and product placement is not making her choices in the same epistemic position as an agent in a different environment, even if she shows the same surface behavior.

In the case of consumer gambling — which I take to be a paradigm of consumer risk in the sense above — the choice architecture is unusually well-documented. U.S. industry-monitoring sources document the variation in disclosure standards, age verification, and self-exclusion mechanisms across jurisdictions. The normative significance of these variations is, I think, underappreciated. Two agents who appear to be making the same voluntary choice may be making meaningfully different choices when their choice architectures differ.

What follows

If voluntariness is a graded property responsive to information and architecture, then the standard view’s simple inference — from voluntary exposure to weakened claims — needs to be considerably refined. Even where exposure is fully voluntary, the moral significance of that voluntariness may be limited by features of the environment over which the agent has limited control.

I do not want to overstate the point. There remain clear cases of voluntary risk-taking in which the agent’s claims are appropriately weakened. The mountaineer who declines a rope is one such case. But many of the cases that the literature has treated as similarly clear — cases involving consumer products, addictive substances, and recreational gambling — are not similarly clear, and treating them as if they were obscures important moral features of the situation.

The takeaway, for me, is that the philosophical work on voluntary risk needs to be done at a higher resolution than is currently typical. I welcome push-back, particularly from those who think the standard view is fine as it stands.

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