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On the Distinction Between What Is Best and What Is Permissible

A familiar move in normative ethics involves distinguishing between what is best for an agent to do and what is merely permissible. The distinction matters for practical reason because it shapes whether we say an agent ought to perform an act, or merely that the act is not forbidden. I want to revisit this distinction here, with a particular focus on what I take to be a recurring source of confusion.

Consider a familiar case. An agent has reason to φ and reason to ψ. The reasons for φ are slightly stronger than the reasons for ψ. Suppose neither act is morally forbidden. Is the agent rationally required to φ?

I think the answer is no, and that the temptation to say yes reflects a slide from φ is best to φ is required. These are distinct claims. The first claims that the reasons favor φ over ψ; the second claims that doing anything other than φ is impermissible. The first claim implies neither the second nor its contrary. A reason can be best-supporting without being demanding.

This is not controversial in the abstract. It becomes controversial in application. When we look at specific cases — should I give a portion of my income to charity, should I take this job over that one, should I keep this promise at the cost of friendship — the distinction begins to do real work, and disagreements about its application start to track substantive views about what morality requires.

The supererogatory

The contemporary literature contains a useful term for the in-between cases: supererogation. An act is supererogatory if it is praiseworthy beyond what is required, and not blameworthy if omitted. Donating a kidney to a stranger is the canonical example. The donation is good. Not donating is not bad.

What I want to suggest is that the supererogatory is more pervasive than it is usually treated as being. Many of our practical decisions sit in this in-between space — there is more reason to do one thing than another, but doing the lesser option is not failing in any specifiable sense. The lesser option is permissible.

This has consequences for how we evaluate agents who consistently take permissible-but-not-best options. The temptation is to say they are doing less than they should. But on the picture I am sketching, “less than they should” is itself ambiguous. They are doing less than what would be best — yes. They are doing less than what is required — no. The first claim is about reasons; the second is about deontic status.

A worry

One might worry that this picture is too permissive. If every act below the best is still permissible, then we lose the resources to criticize people who consistently fall short. The worry is real but, I think, manageable. We can still hold that some patterns of falling short are blameworthy — not because each individual act is wrong, but because the disposition the pattern reveals is problematic.

Consider an analogy. Each individual instance of eating something slightly indulgent is permissible. A lifelong pattern of eating only the most indulgent option available, in every choice situation, may reveal a character flaw — gluttony, weakness of will, indifference to one’s own long-term interests. We can criticize the pattern without claiming that any individual indulgence was forbidden.

The picture, then, is one on which there is a great deal of moral latitude in individual choices, but where patterns of choice can still be evaluated. This seems to me the right shape for an account of practical reason — one that takes seriously the agent’s freedom to choose among permissible options, while preserving the resources for character-based critique.

I welcome objections, particularly from those who think this latitude is too generous. The most pressing objection, I take it, is that the picture cannot account for cases where an agent has overwhelming reason to φ but φ is not strictly required. Such cases, the objector might argue, are precisely the cases where “requirement” should track the reasons. I am sympathetic to the worry, but I think it can be defused by attending more carefully to what we mean by “overwhelming.” That, however, is a discussion for another post.

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