Methodological individualists have a hard time with collective responsibility because they have a hard time with collective agency. If only individual humans act, then the most you can say about “what the corporation did” is that it is a summary of what the people inside it did. Distributing the moral weight back across those individuals is then either trivial (split blame evenly) or impossible (the actions are too entangled to apportion). Both options give bad results.
The List-Pettit move
List and Pettit’s Group Agency (2011) argues that any group with a coherent decision procedure that aggregates members’ attitudes into a stable, action-guiding set of group-level attitudes is an agent in the relevant sense. It has beliefs, it has preferences, it acts on the basis of them. Crucially, the group’s attitudes can come apart from the attitudes of any individual member — the doctrinal paradox is the standard demonstration. That gap is what makes group-level responsibility a real thing rather than a shorthand.
What this entails for blame
- Corporate wrongdoing is not always reducible to individual wrongdoing — sometimes the corporation reasoned badly even when each member reasoned well.
- Members of group agents acquire derived obligations — not just their personal duties, but duties of vigilance over the agent they help constitute.
- Dissolving a group agent does not erase its prior obligations any more than a person’s death erases theirs.
If the corporation is an agent, then “sorry, I just worked there” is no more an exculpation than “sorry, I am just one of his cells.”
The objection I take seriously
The deepest worry is phenomenological: group agents lack experience, and so on a wide range of views about the moral status of agents, they cannot be the kind of thing that deserves blame in the rich sense. I think this is right. Group agents are responsible without being subjects of suffering, and our sanctions on them have to be designed accordingly. That is a feature of the position, not a bug.
The point about derived obligations is the most underrated implication of List-Pettit. We should write more about it.
Useful summary. I would add Tollefsen on collective intentions for the missing piece.