A Note on Decisive Reasons in Normative Ethics
The term “decisive reason” is used in two distinct senses in the contemporary literature. The conflation between them is a source of recurring confusion.
The term “decisive reason” is used in two distinct senses in the contemporary literature. The conflation between them is a source of recurring confusion.
The literature on choice architecture has produced excellent empirical work. The normative side of the conversation, I think, has lagged.
Standard accounts of practical rationality treat each decision as the locus of evaluation. I want to suggest the locus is sometimes the pattern of decisions, not the individual.
Public philosophy is having a moment. The moment is producing a literature that, I want to suggest, has not adequately addressed the question of who it is for.
Williams and Nagel introduced the problem nearly fifty years ago. The literature has not, I think, made much progress on it.
The method of reflective equilibrium is taken to be the dominant methodology in normative ethics. I want to suggest it is doing less work than it is given credit for.
When an agent voluntarily exposes herself to a known risk, what does she owe and what is owed to her? A note on the asymmetry that runs through the literature.
A familiar slide in practical reasoning: from "there is most reason to φ" to "φ is required." The two claims are distinct, and the distinction matters.