Reflective equilibrium — the method, due originally to Rawls, of moving back and forth between considered judgments, candidate principles, and background theories until they cohere — is taken to be the dominant methodology in contemporary normative ethics. It is the method that gets cited when the question “how should we do ethics?” is raised.
I want to suggest, tentatively, that the method is doing less work than it is given credit for. The cases in which reflective equilibrium is actually applied to resolve a substantive disagreement are, I think, rare. More commonly, the method is invoked retrospectively to justify a position the philosopher already held.
What the method requires
The method, in its standard formulation, requires three sets of inputs: considered judgments (intuitions about cases that have been subjected to reflection), candidate principles (general statements that might explain the judgments), and background theories (broader views about persons, agency, society). The method instructs us to adjust each in response to tensions with the others, seeking a state of mutual coherence.
This is well and good as a procedural description. The question is whether the method, so described, has any teeth. Can it deliver verdicts on disputed questions, or does it merely systematize whatever pattern of judgments the practitioner brings to the exercise?
The selection problem
The first worry is about how considered judgments are selected. The method instructs us to start with judgments that survive reflection. But which judgments survive reflection depends on the practitioner’s prior commitments, training, and exposure. Two practitioners with different priors will subject different judgments to different reflections and will, predictably, arrive at different equilibria.
This is not, by itself, a knock-down objection. It is open to the defender of the method to say that different equilibria represent genuine substantive disagreement, and the method does not promise to resolve all disagreement. Fair enough. But then the method has a much more modest role than is usually advertised. It systematizes; it does not adjudicate.
The principle problem
The second worry is about the supply of candidate principles. The method works by seeing how well a principle accounts for the considered judgments. But where do the candidate principles come from? In practice, they come from the philosophical literature — principles that have already been articulated by previous thinkers. This is fine for ordinary applications, but it raises a worry about progress. If reflective equilibrium can only test the principles that have already been articulated, it cannot move us beyond the principles already on the table.
What the method is good for
I do not want to be too negative. Reflective equilibrium does real work, but its work is different from what is often claimed.
The method is good for: (i) exposing inconsistencies in a practitioner’s system of beliefs; (ii) clarifying what a principle commits one to across cases; (iii) making the cost of holding a particular intuition or principle explicit.
The method is less good for: (i) adjudicating disagreements between practitioners with different starting points; (ii) generating novel principles; (iii) producing convergence in the discipline as a whole.
These limitations, I think, are not failures of the method as such. They are limitations on what any method that takes intuitions as inputs can accomplish.
A way forward
If reflective equilibrium has the limitations I have sketched, what should we do? One option is to supplement it with methods that take inputs other than intuitions — experimental, anthropological, historical. Another option is to lower our expectations about what ethical methodology can deliver, and to be honest that much of what passes for argument in normative ethics is really the articulation of pre-theoretic commitments.
I am drawn to the second option, but it is a hard sell. The first option requires interdisciplinary work that few of us are well-positioned to undertake. The second option requires honesty about the limits of the discipline. Neither is comfortable. I am open to suggestions about which is the worse pill to swallow.